Gender and Moral Agency by Shogan, Debra
Gender and Moral 
Agency- Debra Shogan 
University of Alberta 
A B S T R A C T 
Rather than accept that either a justice perspective or a care perspective can be taken to every moral problem, I attempt to show that there are two 
fundamentally different but equally significant moral situations with which both women and men must contend. One type of situation involves those 
instances in which conflict must be adjudicated fairly. The other situation involves those instances in which welfare of sentient beings is at stake and 
adjudication is not necessary. If there are two responses which might be made to every moral problem, these responses might be better understood as a 
dutiful response and a direct response. 
R E S U M E 
Plutot que d'accepter l'idee qu'une perspective judiciaire ou une perspective de bienveillance puisse resoudre tous les problemes de morale, j'essaie c 
demontrer qu ' i l existe deux situations morales bien differentes, quoiqu'aussi importantes l'une que I'autre, auxquelles les hommes et les femmi 
: de 
j es 
peuvent etre confronts: dans certains cas, les conflits doivent etre juges equitablement, alors que dans d'autres, le salut d'etres pensants est en jeu et 
aucun jugement n'est alors necessaire. II existe deux solutions a chaque probleme moral, une solution guidee par le devoir et une solution directe. 
In recent work C a r o l G i l l i g a n claims that either a jus-
tice perspective or a care perspective can be taken to every 
moral problem. 2 1 attempt to show instead that justice and 
care, or what I w i l l refer to as benevolence, 5 are appro-
priate for two fundamental ly different but equally s ignif i -
cant moral situations each of w h i c h require quite distinct 
moral responses. As I w i l l show, it is not possible to take a 
justice perspective to a s i tuation requi r ing benevolence, 
and it is inappropriate to take a benevolence perspective to 
a situation requir ing justice. Gendered differences i n 
responses to these fundamentally different moral situa-
tions may indicate that w o m e n tend to respond more 
readily to situations requir ing benevolence and that men 
may tend to respond more readily to situations requir ing 
justice or, as I w i l l outl ine, gendered differences i n moral 
response may be an ind ica t ion that women tend to 
respond directly to those i n either type of moral situation 
whi le men tend to respond to duty. 
Those moral situations for w h i c h benevolence is ap-
propriate are, for example, those i n w h i c h others are 
injured, starved, homeless, distraught, lost, confused, 
tormented, and the l ike, or i n w h i c h there is no suffering 
but welfare to sentient beings may be improved if they are 
enabled to f lourish. In this type of moral situation, welfare 
of sentient beings is at stake. W h e n a moral agent is 
confronted w i t h this type of si tuation, a desire for the 
welfare of those i n the s i tuat ion is a desire to help, or, if 
one is not i n a posi t ion to help, it is a desire that someone 
else helps. T h i s desire for the welfare of sentient beings is a 
benevolent desire and a mora l response to this type of 
situation is a benevolent response. 
T h e other type of mora l situation is one i n w h i c h there 
is a confl ict between sentient beings or sentient beings and 
a standard, 4 the resolution of w h i c h requires adjudicat ion 
so that those i n the conflict are treated fairly. W h e n a 
moral agent is confronted w i t h this type of si tuation, a 
desire that those i n the conflict are treated fairly is a desire 
to be fair if one is an adjudicator, or a desire that others are 
fair when they adjudicate. A desire for fair treatment is a 
just desire and a moral response to the si tuation is a just 
response. 
Adjudica t ion of a conflict may result i n enhancement of 
welfare. Often, however, adjudication w i l l result i n d i -
minished welfare for one or more i n a conflict even though 
fair treatment is achieved. If, for example, a student is 
denied her university degree because her grades are not 
accurately recorded by the registrar's office, fair adjudica-
t ion of the problem w o u l d result i n her obta in ing credit 
for the courses and being awarded her degree. T h i s w o u l d 
also enhance her welfare. 5 O n the other hand, when two 
people conflict over a p a r k i n g spot, fair adjudicat ion may 
result i n one person los ing any c l a i m to the p a r k i n g spot. 
Both are treated fairly even though one may be inconven-
ienced as a result of h a v i n g to look for another p a r k i n g 
spot. 
Contrary to G i l l i g a n , it is not possible to take a justice 
perspective to every moral problem, and it is inappro-
priate to take a benevolence perspective to every moral 
problem. It is inappropriate for a benevolent desire to 
override a desire to adjudicate fairly i n situations requir-
i n g justice because, a l though welfare of some might be 
improved, this may be achieved at the expense of fairness. 
It is nonsensical to have a just desire override a benevolent 
desire i n a s i tuat ion i n w h i c h there is no adjudicat ion 
necessary. Unless there is some reason to believe that a sick 
person is not receiving attention commensurate to her 
illness, for example, there is no need to desire her fair 
treatment. Instead, one desires that she becomes w e l l . 
The Relationship of Duty to Benevolence and Justice 
F r o m time to time, a m o r a l agent w i l l be confronted 
w i t h mora l situations i n w h i c h she or he does not desire 
the welfare or fair treatment of particular beings i n partic-
ular moral situations. T h i s may be because they are too 
remote, because there is something abhorrent about them 
(for example, c h i l d molesters), or s imply because, i n the 
particular situation, one has another desire w h i c h over-
rides a desire to treat others w e l l or fairly. In these situa-
tions, one could , for example, put thoughts of starving 
people out of one's m i n d , let the c h i l d molester be lynched, 
or try to beat the rush h o u r traffic when someone has been 
in jured o n the street. O n e could attempt to override one's 
apathy, hatred, or conf l i c t ing desire by r e m i n d i n g oneself 
what it is about responding moral ly that one finds com-
p e l l i n g and w h y it is c o m p e l l i n g i n that part icular 
instance. T h i s response is only indirectly focussed o n 
those i n a part icular m o r a l s i tuation. Focus is, instead, o n 
f u l f i l l i n g a duty of benevolence or justice. 6 
What someone desires is both part of the description of 
that person's mot ivat ion and part of the description of her 
or his response. T o desire that someone is treated wel l or 
fairly is to respond to that person and is, therefore, moral ly 
significant. Since a d u t i f u l response only indirectly focus-
ses o n those i n a moral situation, a mora l response w h i c h 
requires r e m i n d i n g oneself of what is moral ly important 
is less moral ly signif icant than a direct reponse when it is 
possible to make a direct response. A promise kept because 
I have made it to someone w h o is c o u n t i n g o n me, for 
example, has more mora l signficance than a promise kept 
because I want to f u l f i l l a duty I recognize to keep p r o m -
ises. It is important to state again, however, that it is not 
possible directly to desire welfare and fair treatment of a l l 
sentient beings. (We c o u l d not possibly k n o w a l l sentient 
beings as indiv idua ls a n d circumstance often makes direct 
desire di f f icul t or impossible.) W h e n it is not directly 
possible to desire others' welfare or fair treatment, to 
respond from duty is not less moral ly significant. 
Moral Reasons and Moral Emotions 
Based o n what I have said about there being two fun-
damentally different mora l situations to w h i c h a mora l 
agent may respond either directly or dut i fu l ly , it is possi-
ble to identify four distinct moral responses. There is the 
response i n w h i c h one has a direct desire for others' wel-
fare i n situations not requir ing adjudication; there is the 
response i n w h i c h one has a desire to do one's duty i n 
situations w h i c h do not require adjudication; there is the 
response i n w h i c h one has a direct desire that those i n a 
conflict are treated fairly; and f inal ly , there is the response 
i n w h i c h one has a desire to do one's duty i n situations 
w h i c h involve a conflict. 
These four moral responses can be further differentiated 
according to the role moral reasons and moral emotions 
play i n each. I w i l l outl ine these distinctions i n order to 
make some comments about gendered differences i n moral 
responses. 
/. Moral Motivating Reasons 
In order for a moral agent to respond to a mora l situa-
t ion, she or he must understand that a s i tuation is one i n 
w h i c h another's welfare or fair treatment is at stake. In 
order to respond moral ly to a moral situation, however, a 
moral agent must not only understand that a particular 
s i tuation is a mora l situation, she or he must desire that 
those i n the moral situation are treated wel l or fairly. T o be 
motivated to respond moral ly to a particular moral situa-
t ion entails that one has beliefs about the context i n w h i c h 
a response w o u l d be appropriate ( inc luding beliefs about 
what makes a particular situation a moral situation) and a 
desire to respond w i t h i n this context. W h e n a mora l per-
son is confronted w i t h a situation w h i c h requires a benev-
olent response, the motivat ing reason to respond consists 
of understanding relevant beliefs associated w i t h what 
makes the particular situation an instance i n w h i c h wel-
fare is at stake and a desire that the welfare of those i n the 
si tuation is enhanced. When a mora l person is confronted 
w i t h a moral situation w h i c h requires a just response, the 
mot ivat ing reason to respond consists of understanding 
relevant beliefs associated w i t h what makes the particular 
situation an instance in w h i c h fair adj udicat ion is an issue 
and a desire that those i n the conflict are treated fairly. A n 
abi l i ty to respond to a moral mot ivat ing reason is a 
rational abil i ty. In order to respond to someone w h o has 
fal len i n the street, for example, one must be able to 
understand the concepts of harm and help and be able to 
see the situation as one i n w h i c h someone is harmed. T o 
have certain beliefs w h i c h are, i n turn, composed of cer-
tain concepts, to appraise a situation i n a certain way and 
to be able to respond to these beliefs and appraisals a l l 
make u p the rational abil i ty to respond to motivat ing 
reasons. N o t only is it not necessary for someone to be able 
to articulate conditions of moral concepts or expla in what 
it is about a part icular s i tuation w h i c h motivates one's 
response, to do so at the time of a moral situation w o u l d 
interfere w i t h a moral response. A n agent's moral ration-
ality is indicated when she or he responds to the person 
w h o has fallen. 
1.1 Emotions and Moral Motivating Reasons 
Emot ional i ty is often contrasted w i t h rationality and, 
because rationality is often thought to be central to moral 
agency, a perception that women's moral agency is dist in-
guished by emotions is taken as an indicat ion that women 
cannot be ful ly mora l . 7 If women do tend to be more 
emotional than men, this does not demonstrate that 
women are, then, less rat ional . T h i s is because, as I w i l l 
show, moral emotions are also rational when based o n 
benevolent or just desires, rational beliefs and evaluations. 
A n emot ion is a feeling one experiences when one has a 
part icular desire, has beliefs about an object or event and 
evaluates those beliefs in a certain way. I desire not to be 
harmed, and I believe that this is an an imal w i t h very 
sharp teeth. If I also evaluate the a n i m a l as threatening, I 
experience fear. Fear is just the feeling one experiences 
when one desires not to be harmed when evaluating some-
t h i n g as threatening. T h i s is not to say that a l l combina-
tions of desires and evaluated beliefs have corresponding 
emotions. N o t a l l desires and evaluations have corres-
p o n d i n g emotions, but a l l emotions entail a correspond-
i n g desire and evaluated beliefs. 
Emot ions are conceptually related to the type of ration-
ality associated w i t h motivat ing reasons. Mot iva t ing rea-
sons are comprised of desires and beliefs, and emotions are 
a necessary result of certain desires and evaluated beliefs. 
Emot ions and rationality are not opposites, a l though 
emotions can be unreasonable if desire, beliefs or evalua-
tions of beliefs are unreasonable. 
A moral emot ion is a necessary response to a moral 
situation i n w h i c h the motivat ing reason for responding is 
others' welfare or fair treatment. If, for example, I desire 
that another is treated fairly, have beliefs about what 
counts as fair treatment i n this instance, and evaluate this 
as an instance i n w h i c h another is not treated fairly, I 
experience an emotion. If an i n d i v i d u a l does not receive 
fair treatment when I desire this person's fair treatment 
and the other conditions are met, I experience disap-
pointment to anger, depending on the severity of the 
situation; if the i n d i v i d u a l flourishes, I experience satis-
faction to joy. S imi lar ly , if I desire someone's welfare, have 
beliefs about what counts as welfare i n this instance, eval-
uate this as an instance i n w h i c h someone's welfare is at 
stake, and, if I or someone else cannot help, I experience 
regret or sorrow. If I do not act because of a conf l i c t ing 
desire w h i c h is stronger than my desire for the person's 
welfare, I experience gui l t or remorse, and so o n . A moral 
emotion is conceptually connected to the rational ability 
to respond to moral motivat ing reasons. 
A mora l emotion is conceptually connected to moral 
m o t i v a t i n g reasons; it is part of a mora l response, and it is 
morally significant to the recipient of the response. A moral 
emotion is signifcant to the recipient because, if properly 
displayed, it is an indicat ion that the person responding 
Because of the conceptual connection between emotion 
and desire, the sincere display of emot ion indicates 
whether someone's behavior is the result of motivat ion 
directed at the person i n the predicament or whether the 
behavior has another mot ivat ion . 8 
2. Moral Adjudicating Reasons 
A d j u d i c a t i n g reasons are reasons a moral agent pro-
vides when deciding how others are to be treated fairly 
when there is a conflict between sentient beings or sentient 
beings and a standard. Fair adjudicat ion is achieved when 
a moral agent provides reasons w h i c h are relevant to sort-
i n g out a conflict. (Just what reasons are relevant is not 
always obvious. Race, for example, is relevant i n some 
contexts and irrelevant i n others. Race is clearly irrelevant 
to being able to take part i n and enjoy s w i m m i n g , for 
example. In other contexts, however, to be b l i n d to race 
w o u l d be to continue to favour those w h o have benefitted 
from racial exclusion.) A n abi l i ty to provide adjudicating 
reasons i n moral situations i n v o l v i n g conflict requires 
that the adjudicator be impart ia l to irrelevant personal 
features of those i n the conflict and that the conflict is not 
resolved i n such a way that it is personally beneficial. Iris 
M u r d o c h calls this abi l i ty "detachment"—an abil i ty to 
look at and love something wi thout seizing, us ing or 
appropr ia t ing it to the "greedy organism of the self." 9 
Impartial i ty does not require separation from others or 
indifference to those i n a conflict. T o desire directly others' 
fair treatment is to be connected to them. 
2.1 Emotions and Moral Adjudicating Reasons 
If someone does desire that others are treated fairly, she 
or he w i l l experience a corresponding emotion related to 
the severity of injustice someone suffers and related to how 
the conflict is resolved. T h i s emotion is moral ly s ignif i -
cant because, when sincerely displayed, it indicates that 
someone desires fair treatment of those i n the predica-
ment. In other words, display of sincerely felt emotion is 
an indicat ion of connection to those i n the conflict. 
It is important to note that, w h i l e to experience moral 
emotion is always moral ly significant, to experience 
m o r a l emot ion to the extent that it inhibi ts someone f rom 
f u l f i l l i n g her or his role as an adjudicator is to fa i l to act as 
a fu l ly func t ion ing moral agent i n that situation. A d j u d i -
cators w h o become overwhelmed by the p l ight of people 
i n situations i n v o l v i n g conflict may have the abil i ty to 
adjudicate a problem yet not be able to shift attention 
away f rom the experience of emotion to actually adjudi-
cate the conflict fairly. 
3. Moral Justifying Reasons 
Jus t i fy ing reasons, as I have been us ing them here, are 
reasons w h i c h a mora l agent utilizes to be reminded that a 
particular situation is one i n w h i c h a moral response is 
appropriate and to recall what one finds compel l ing about 
responding moral ly . M o r a l jus t i fy ing reasons are uti l ized 
i n situations i n w h i c h someone does not directly desire 
others' welfare or fair treatment. For example, if I a m 
h u r r y i n g to get to a concert w hen I see someone w h o looks 
very lost, I may not directly desire to help this person qua 
person but I give directions because I remind myself of 
reasons w h i c h justify h e l p i n g people i n this type of situa-
t ion. I respond because I acknowledge that I have a duty to 
help. What is involved here is a rat ional abi l i ty to remind 
oneself of reasons w h i c h justify responding moral ly i n 
those instances i n w h i c h one does not direcly desire others' 
welfare or fair treatment. 
3.1 Emotions and Moral Justifying Reasons 
Someone w h o desires to f u l f i l l a duty w i l l experience 
some degree of disappointment or regret if thwarted i n 
f u l f i l l i n g this duty or w i l l feel some degree of satisfaction 
if the duty is fu l f i l l ed . There is, however, an important 
dist inct ion between an emotion experienced by someone 
as a result of desir ing that things go w e l l or fairly for some 
particular person and an emotion experienced by some-
one as a result of desir ing to f u l f i l l a duty. Someone w h o 
desires others' welfare or fair treatment w i l l experience an 
emotion both d u r i n g the moral situation and i n response 
to whether the situation is resolved. T h i s is because she or 
he is motivated by what is happening to particular i n d i -
viduals i n the moral situation. Someone w h o desires that a 
duty be ful f i l led, on the other hand, experiences an emo-
t ion when it is determined whether a duty has been f u l -
f i l l ed or thwarted. T h i s is because her or his concern is for 
duty and not directly for those i n the situation. As I have 
said, an emotion experienced as a result of a desire for 
others' welfare or fair treatment is s ignif icant to those i n a 
mora l situation because it is an indicat ion of another's 
concern for them. A n emotion experienced as a result of a 
desire to f u l f i l l a duty is not particularly significant 
because the emotion is an indicat ion of a concern that a 
duty be ful f i l led and not a direct concern for those i n the 
situation. 
Gender and Moral Agency 
I have argued that there are two general types of moral 
situations w i t h w h i c h we are faced as moral agents—those 
moral situations w h i c h involve adjudication and those 
w h i c h do not. I have also said that i n each of these situa-
tions it is possible either to respond directly to those i n a 
moral situation or to respond indirectly after acknowledg-
i n g a duty to respond. Keeping i n m i n d these moral 
responses, I want to make some comments about possible 
interpretations of gendered differences i n moral responses. 
Benevolent Responses and Just Responses 
A n y reported differences i n moral responses of men and 
women w i l l need to sort whether women are more l ikely to 
respond to situations i n w h i c h benevolence is appropriate 
whi le men are more l ikely to respond to situations i n 
w h i c h justice is appropriate. If men do tend to respond 
from a justice perspective whi le women tend to respond 
from a care or benevolence perspective, it does not then 
f o l l o w that there are two perspectives to be taken to every 
mora l situation. Rather it is an indicat ion that social 
expectations and experiences of women and men prepare 
them differently for two fundamentally different moral 
tasks. It is important to re-emphasize that G i l l i g a n ' s c la im 
for two different perspectives to every moral problem is 
different from the c l a i m I make about their being two 
distinct moral situations to w h i c h one could only approp-
riately respond either benevolently or justly. 
If there are tendencies for women to respond to situa-
tions requir ing benevolence and for men to respond to 
situations requir ing justice, these tendencies may mirror a 
private-public split i n w h i c h situations requi r ing benevo-
lence are more prevalent than situations requi r ing justice 
i n the private sphere whi le situations requi r ing justice are 
more prevalent than situations requir ing benevolence i n 
the p u b l i c sphere. However, even if this is the case, moral 
situations do not neatly divide i n this way. People do not 
cease to become injured, or to be troubled, or be dis-
traught, when they do publ i c functions. A benevolent 
response is as appropriate i n publ i c as it is i n private when 
welfare is at stake. So, too, conflicts do not only occur i n 
p u b l i c institutions and adjudication is not only the pur-
view of those w h o f i l l inst i tut ional roles. Confl icts requir-
i n g fair adjudication also occur between friends and fam-
i ly members, and this adjudicat ion is often performed by 
other friends and family members. If women tend to avoid 
situations requir ing adjudication or adjudicate badly 
w h e n they do adjudicate because, as H a r d i n g interprets 
G i l l i g a n , "subjectively a felt hurt appears i m m o r a l to 
w o m e n whether or not it is f a i r , " 1 0 then responding only 
to "felt h u r t " w i l l be inappropriate i n those situations i n 
w h i c h it is important to achieve fairness. S imi lar ly , men 
w i l l be deficient as moral agents if they tend to " w o r r y 
about people interfering w i t h one another's r ights" i n a l l 
mora l situations. 1 1 There are moral situations i n w h i c h 
consideration of rights just is not relevant to a moral 
response. 
2. Direct Response and Dutiful Response 
T o desire directly others' welfare or fair treatment is to 
be moral ly connected to them. Connect ion to others is 
possible and moral ly significant both i n situations i n 
w h i c h a benevolent response is appropriate and in situa-
tions i n w h i c h a just response is appropriate. There is not 
the al ignment between care and connection and justice 
and separateness that G i l l i g a n suggests. 
Results w h i c h show that women tend to connect to 
others whi le men tend to separate is not, as I have said, an 
ind ica t ion that w o m e n tend to respond w i t h care w h i l e 
men tend to respond w i t h justice to every mora l situation. 
Instead, women's tendency to connect may indicate that 
w o m e n tend to respond directly to others i n moral situa-
tions requir ing either benevolence or justice. Men's ten-
dancy to separate f rom others by emphasizing autonomy 
and rights may, o n the other hand, be an indicat ion that 
men tend to respond to duty rather than directly to those i n 
moral situations. Whether women do directly desire oth-
ers' welfare and fair treatment, whi le men desire to f u l f i l l 
duties, is possibly reflected i n expression of moral emotion 
at the time of a mora l response. As I have said, when 
someone desires another's welfare or fair treatment, she or 
he experiences emotion both d u r i n g the m o r a l s i tuation 
and at its resolution, whereas when someone desires to do 
a duty, emotion is experienced when it is determined 
whether the sitation has been resolved. It is important to 
note that both women and men are faced w i t h moral 
situations i n w h i c h it is not possible directly to desire 
others' welfare or fair treatment and, therefore, both 
women and men must be able to respond to duty. Clearly, 
also, o n some occasions both women and men do respond 
directly to those i n mora l situations. 
Concluding Remarks 
C a r o l G i l l i g a n ' s In A Different Voice12 was an impetus 
for others to consider the importance of accounting for 
connection i n moral theory. 1 5 W i t h the recognition that 
connection is important to understanding morality has 
also come the caut ion that morali ty must not be reduced to 
connec t ion . 1 4 N o t a l l connection to others is moral ly sig-
nif icant . Indeed, some profound connections to others are 
the sources of powerlessness, dependence, and submis-
siveness. Even when connection to others is indicative of a 
desire for welfare or fair treatment, this connection can be 
problematic if it is thought to be an important attribute of 
only some. Connect ion, af f i l iat ion, and relation, often 
thought to be virtues for women, are often also sources of 
women's oppression. Connect ion to others has moral sig-
nificance when it is indicative of a desire to help others and 
treat them fairly i n a communi ty i n w h i c h moral connec-
t ion is appropriate for a l l . 
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